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addition to these parties, the following parties were named as defendants in the
trial court case: Robert R. Busch, Starley D. Bush, D. Gregory Hales, S and M
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Riverside appeals the final order certifying as final the summary judgment
entered by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod against Riverside and in favor of
TBC. (R. at 306-07.) Riverside filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 5,
2005. (R. at 308-15.) The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001) and has transferred the case to the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2001).
III.

ISSUE STATEMENT

Two issues are presented for review.
First, did the trial court err when it granted TBC's Motion for Summary
Judgment and determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed relating to
what constituted the parties' integrated agreement.
Second, did the trial court err when it granted TBC's Motion for Summary
Judgment and determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed relating to
Riverside's defense of fraud in the inducement.
3

An appellate court reviews a summary judgment determination for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. CCD.
L.C. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, ^14,116 P.3d 366 (Utah 2005) (additional citation
omitted). Accordingly, an appellate court determines only whether the trial court
erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that
no disputed issues of material fact exist. Id In so doing, a reviewing court must
view the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was
entered in the trial court. Webb v. R.O.A. General. Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) (additional citation omitted).
Riverside preserved the arguments set forth in this appeal in its
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile Home Park, (r. at 179-210), and/or
during oral argument on TBC's Motion for Summary Judgment, (r. at 322, p. 511).
IV.

DETERMINATIVE RULES

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
4

to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This case involves a dispute between Riverside and TBC over the validity
and/or interpretation of a real estate listing agreement. Through this appeal,
Riverside seeks a reversal of the trial court's entry of summary judgment and a
determination that (1) the parties originally agreed to split in half a four-percent
(4%) commission contemplated in a real estate listing agreement and (2) genuine
issues of material fact exist as to whether Riverside was induced to enter the
agreement by fraud.
Course of Proceedings
TBC commenced this action on or about August 12, 2002 in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. at 1-16.) On or
about May 25,2004, TBC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 151-53.)
Disposition in Trial Court
The trial court granted TBC's Motion for Summary Judgment on September
20,2004. (R. at 322, p. 11, In. 6.) The trial court entered an Order Granting
Summary Judgment, (r. at 236-38), and a corresponding Judgment, (r. at 239-41)
on October 20,2004. The trial court entered an Order Granting Rule 54(b)
5

Certification on August 1, 2005. (R. at 306-07.)
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues on Appeal
In or about June 2001, James Burgess ("Burgess") of TBC contacted Greg
Hales ("Hales"), a principal of Riverside, for the purpose of soliciting the sale of
the Riverside Mobile Home Park (the "Park"). (R. at 205.) Burgess represented to
Hales that TBC had a buyer willing to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park. (Id.)
At the time that Burgess approached Hales, Hales was a licensed real estate agent
and owner of a real estate brokerage himself (Realty West, LLC ["Realty West"]),
(r. at 31), with no need for another broker to list and market the Park for sale, (r. at
322, p. 9, In. 5-7). But, because - and only because — of Burgess's representations
that TBC had a buyer that was willing to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park,
Riverside executed a Limited Listing Agreement (the "LLA") with TBC wherein
TBC agreed to evenly split the standard four percent (4%) real estate commission
with Realty West (inadvertently referred to as Development West due to
typographical error). (R. at 205.) With the unsigned LLA containing the four
percent (4%) provision, TBC sent a fax cover sheet which unambiguously stated:
"Dear Greg, Please review, execute A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer. I agree
to split total [sic] fee indicated herein 50:50 with Development West. James." (R.
at 209,322, p. 5, In. 23-25; p. 6, In. 1.) Among other things, the LLA stated that
6

"Owner grants Agent the limited right to secure an acceptable buyer, however,
Agent is to only solicit those clients which he has registered with Owner." (R. at
171.) Riverside only entered a listing agreement with TBC because TBC had
represented that it had a potential buyer at $5.5 million, (r. at 322, p. 9, In. 7-11),
i.e., but for TBC's representation, Riverside would have never entered the LLA, (r.
at 205).
Shortly after executing the LLA, Riverside learned that TBC's buyer was
Affordable Residential Communities ("ARC"). (Id.) Riverside and ARC entered
a purchase contract in October 2001 (the "Purchase Contract"). (Id.) However,
during ARC's due diligence period, Riverside learned that ARC's willingness to
pay $5.5 million was based on a brochure prepared by Burgess and TBC which
contained inaccurate business performance data, i.e., data based on other mobile
home park businesses rather than data from Riverside's own business data. (R. at
205-06.) Once ARC learned of TBC's improper valuation and through due
diligence obtained accurate information from Riverside, it was no longer willing
to pay $5.5 million for the Park. (R. at 206.)
Thereafter, because of TBC's misrepresentations, ARC began negotiating
directly with Riverside. (R. at 34.) Ultimately, because of TBC's misleading
evaluation, ARC reduced its offer to $4.8 million to purchase the Park,
7

considerably less than the amount originally contemplated and represented by
TBC. (R. at 206.) Riverside agreed to the amount, but only if paid in full at the
time of purchase and only if the sales commission was reduced from a total of four
percent (4%) to a total of two percent (2%). (R. at 192, 206.) Because of
Burgess's and TBC's improper evaluation which significantly lowered the
purchase price, Riverside and TBC modified their agreement regarding
commissions by lowering the commission to two percent (2%), with one percent
(1%) being paid to TBC and one percent (1%) being paid to Realty West. (R. at
206.) This modification was reflected in the Purchase Contract. (R. at 192.) At no
time after the execution of the Purchase Contract did Burgess or TBC contest the
two percent (2%) commission arrangement. (R. at 206.) The sale of the Park
eventually fell through and the Purchase Contract was terminated when ARC's
due diligence results further conflicted with Burgess's and TBC's representations
and when ARC refused to pay the entire purchase price at closing. QdL)
Several months later, ARC again contacted Riverside and expressed interest
in purchasing the Park. (R. at 206-07.) Prior to entering a new purchase contract,
Burgess and TBC again acknowledged in a letter to ARC on February 27,2002
that the total commission was no longer four percent (4%) but two percent (2%).
(R. at 207, 210.) In this same letter, in violation of his ethical duties as a licensed
8

real estate broker and as Riverside's representative, Burgess suggested that the
two percent (2%) commission be split between TBC and Realty West but that the
sales price be raised by $50,000 so that an additional " 1 % [could be] discretely
paid" to TBC. (R. at 207.) Riverside eventually sold the Park to ARC for $4.6
million, (r. at 144), and this dispute subsequently arose between the parties.
VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In the current case, even without the benefit owed to Riverside of this
Court's favorable interpretation of the allegations of record, Burgess and TBC's
own correspondence conclusively creates genuinely disputed issues of material
fact which precluded entry of summary judgment against Riverside in the trial
court case. By its own documentation, TBC was never entitled to a four percent
(4%) commission on the sale of the Park. Based on long-standing precedent in
Utah and in other jurisdictions, TBC's facsimile cover sheet clarifying that TBC
was only to receive half of the four percent (4%) commission, presented to
Riverside contemporaneously with the LLA, constitute the entire integrated
agreement between the parties. This agreement was further clarified by Burgess's
February 27,2002 letter wherein Burgess, on behalf of TBC, explicitly stated that
the total commission of two percent (2%) was "fine with me." The trial court
erred by failing to consider the facsimile cover sheet as part of the integrated
9

agreement, or to consider it at all for that matter, and by failing to consider
Burgess's letter.
Moreover, the trial court erred by excluding as parol evidence, information
supporting Riverside's claim that TBC fraudulently induced Riverside into
entering the LLA by representing that TBC had a buyer prepared to pay $5.5
million to purchase the Park. Hales, as a licensed real estate agent and broker, had
no reason to enter a listing agreement with another agent and would not have done
so but for TBC's misrepresentations. Accordingly, in the face of fraud being an
exception to the parol evidence rule, the trial court erred by not finding a genuine
issue of a material fact relating to evidence supporting Riverside's fraud defense.
In sum, when all facts of record are viewed in favor of Riverside as the nonprevailing party in the trial court case, genuine issues of material fact preclude
entry of summary judgment in favor of TBC, and this matter should be remanded
to the trial court for the trier of fact to resolve the disputed issues of fact at trial.

10

VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT
NO GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED
AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTED THE PARTIES'
INTEGRATED AGREEMENT.
1.

The trial court erred by failing to consider the facsimile
cover sheet accompanying the limited listing agreement
as part of the integrated agreement.

It is a well-settled principle of contract law that two or more
contemporaneous instruments which address the same subject matter "should be
construed together and interpreted as a whole, each one contributing to the
ascertainment of the true intent of the parties." See e.g., Steinke v. Sungard
Financial Systems, 121 F.3d 763, 771 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) (where court construed
an employment offer letter and a signed employment agreement together as one
complete expression of the parties' agreement) (quoting Kroblin Refrigerated
Xpress. Inc. v. Pitterich. 805 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1986)). Moreover, "[t]he
underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the
intentions of the parties to the contract. I n interpreting a contract, the intentions of
the parties are controlling.'" Web-Bank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp..
2002 UT 88, Tfl7, 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002) (additional citations omitted). The
Utah Supreme Court has declared that such a "[r]ational interpretation requires at
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least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the
intention of the parties . . . so that the court can 'place itself in the same situation
in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting.'" Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n.. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995) (additional citations
omitted).
Specifically, and "[w]ithout doubt[,] a covering letter may constitute a part
of the total agreement." Brown v. Financial Service Corp.. Int'l.. 489 F.2d 144,
149 (5th Cir. 1974). Additionally, "a writing should be interpreted as a whole and
all the writings that are part of the same transaction should be interpreted
together." Confer Plastics v. Hunkar Lab.. 964 F. Supp. 73, 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(additional citations omitted). In terms of the parol evidence rule, a cover letter "is
neither a 'prior agreement' between the parties nor a 'contemporaneous oral
agreement.' Therefore, the cover letter is not excluded under the parol evidence
rule." Id at 79. Finally, "[a] cover letter, as other extrinsic writings, may
constitute a part of the agreement of parties to a contract...." Richardson
Engineering Co. v. International Business Machines Corp.. 554 F. Supp. 467,470
(D. Vt. 1981). Where a "cover letter in some respects attempts to modify the
[contract document] that it accompanied, the [contract document] is not a complete
integration of the parties' understanding. Consideration of the cover letter does
12

not, therefore, violate the parol evidence rule because the cover letter is part of the
contract." IdL
Despite its obligation to interpret the facsimile cover sheet and the LLA
together, and to undertake a "preliminary consideration of all credible evidence
offered to prove the intention of the parties," the trial court failed to consider the
cover sheet altogether, apparently considering the cover sheet to be parol
evidence. Specifically, the trial court failed to make any determination whether
the LLA was intended to be an integration independent of the cover sheet and
erred when it dismissed without any consideration the cover sheet as parol
evidence. In response to Riverside's argument on this issue at the hearing, the
trial court, without any discernable analysis, summarily ruled as a matter of law
that "it's a straight forward matter. We have one contract [i.e., the LLA] and then
we've got a bunch of parole [sic] evidence. Plaintiffs motion is granted as
prayed." (R. at 322, p. 11, In. 3-6.)
Unfortunately, the matter was far from "straight forward." The only
undisputed fact relating to the LLA was that on or about July 1,2001, Riverside
signed a document entitled "Limited Listing Agreement." However, Riverside
disputed that the LLA comprised the entire integrated commission agreement
between the parties. (R. at 205.) Hales, a principal of Riverside and Realty West,
13

(r. at 31), negotiated the commission split with TBC on behalf of Riverside before
signing the LLA.
The facsimile cover sheet accompanying the LLA clearly manifests that
prior to signing the LLA, Riverside and TBC agreed that the four percent (4%)
commission referred to in the LLA would be split 50/50, with TBC only receiving
half of the commission. (R. at 209.) The cover sheet unambiguously states:
"Dear Greg, Please review, execute A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer. I agree
to split total [sic] fee indicated herein 50:50 with Development West. James."
(Id) TBC has not disputed that the cover sheet was sent to Hales with the
unsigned LLA. The "fee indicated herein" unarguably refers to the four percent
(4%) total commission described in the LLA. No rational interpretation allows for
the facsimile cover sheet and the LLA to be interpreted separately. Together, and
even without the benefit of being viewed in the light most favorable to Riverside,
they conclusively demonstrate that the original intent of the parties was for TBC to
receive a two percent (2%) commission. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
granting TBC's Motion and, at a bare minimum, a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to the parties' intent relating to the commission amount.

14

2.

The trial court erred by failing to consider TBC's February
27,2002 letter, apparently considering it to be parol evidence
exempt from consideration.

It is axiomatic that the parol evidence rule is limited to prior or
contemporaneous conversations, representations or statements. Spears v. Warr.
2002 UT 24, f 19,44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added).
TBC's February 27, 2002 letter clearly indicates that TBC expected to split
evenly with Realty West the total commission from the sale of the Park. (R. at
210.) Burgess, on behalf of TBC, unequivocally states in the letter that "[e]ither
scenario (with a total 2% commission) was fine with me . . . . " (Id.) In fact,
Burgess, in violation of his ethical duties as a real estate broker and agent, goes as
far as suggesting that one percent (1%) be paid to TBC above board and an
additional one percent (1%) be "discretely paid" to TBC. (Id.) This letter is
further evidence (clearly not barred by the parol evidence rule) which
demonstrates that the parties' original agreement was that TBC receive a two
percent (2%) commission and then it reflects at least disputed facts relating to
modification resulting in TBC's right to a one percent (1%) commission.
The trial court apparently lumped this letter in with the "bunch of parol
evidence" which it referenced in its ruling. However, TBC wrote the letter nearly
eight months after Riverside's execution of the LLA. The letter, therefore, is
15

neither a prior nor contemporaneous instrument and should have been considered
by the trial court in its determination of the parties' contractual intent.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT NO GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL
FACT EXISTED AS TO RIVERSIDE'S CLAIM FOR
FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT.

It is well settled in Utah that fraud in the inducement is a viable defense to
contract formation. See generally. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah
1985). Relatedly, Utah law is clear that evidence of fraud in contract formation is
not barred by the parol evidence rule: "Simply stated, the [parol evidence] rule
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous conversations,
statements, or representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the
terms of an [integrated] contract." I d at 665 (emphasis added) (additional
citations omitted).
In Union Bank, a Utah Supreme Court case highly instructive to the case
before this Court, the Swensons executed a promissory note, individually and
personally, in favor of Union Bank. IcL at 664. When the Swensons defaulted,
Union Bank brought suit and subsequently moved for summary judgment. IcL
The Swensons each filed an affidavit in opposition to Union Bank's motion for
summary judgment, alleging that the bank officer told them that their personal
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signatures were needed to satisfy bank auditors and the loan committee. Id The
Swensons further asserted that the bank officer assured them that they would not
be personally liable and without these assurances they would not have signed the
note. Id The trial court excluded the Swensons' affidavit testimony based on the
parol evidence rule and granted summary judgment in favor of Union Bank. Id at
664-65.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
Swensons' allegations raised genuine issues of material fact "as to whether the
parties assented to the writing as a final statement of the intended agreement" and
whether the Swensons' "personal execution of the note was fraudulently induced."
Id. at 666. The court reasoned that in any case of contract interpretation, a court
must first determine whether the writing alleged to constitute the contract was
intended by the parties to be an integration. Id at 664. "In resolving this
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is
admissible." Id (additional citation omitted).
The court further opined that even after a court determines that a writing is
an integration, parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud and/or "to show the
circumstances under which the contract was made or the purpose for which the
writing was executed." I d In short, "[w]hat appears to be a complete and binding
17

integrated agreement... may be voidable for

fraud

Such invalidating causes

need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the writing." Id (citing
Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 214 comment C [1981].)
The trial court failed to address both the integration question and the fraud
question, and instead incorrectly took the LLA "on its face" without further
consideration. At oral argument, the trial court rejected Riverside's fraud in the
inducement argument out of hand without considering any evidence other than the
wording of the LLA, stating - "But there's no contingencies in the listing
agreement." (R. at 322, p. 9, In. 15-16.) In so doing, the trial court apparently
espoused the position that per the terms of the LLA, if the Park sold, Riverside
was obligated to pay TBC a four percent (4%) commission, period.
Based on the reasoning in Union Bank, the Affidavit of D. Gregory Hales
assuredly creates genuine issues of material fact as to both issues of whether the
LLA alone was intended by the parties to be an integrated agreement and whether
Riverside was fraudulently induced by TBC into signing the LLA. In or about
June 2001, TBC contacted Hales and represented to him that it had a buyer willing
to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park. (R. at 205.) Despite the trial court's
view, the LLA did in fact contain contingencies. The LLA stated that "Owner
grants Agent the limited right to secure an acceptable buyer, however, Agent is to
18

only solicit those clients which he has registered with Owner." (R. at 171.)
Still, while the trial court's interpretation of the LLA was erroneous, the
issue at hand deals with the court's failure to even consider the parol evidence
relating to fraud in the inducement. As in Union Bank, the "invalidating causes"
of the LLA did not "appear on the face of the writing." Riverside was induced to
sign the LLA by TBC's misrepresentation that it had a ready, willing, and able
buyer, prepared to pay $5.5 million for the Park. (R. at 205.) The facsimile cover
sheet, which accompanied the unsigned LLA, instructed Hales to "review, execute
A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer." (r. at 209), supporting Riverside's assertion
that it relied on TBC's representation that TBC had a buyer prepared to purchase
the Park for $5.5 million. Hales' affidavit testimony further states that but for this
representation, he never would have signed the LLA. (R. at 205.) In fact, as
argued by Riverside at the hearing, Hales, as a licensed real estate broker, had no
need for another broker to list the Park unless the broker already had a buyer ready
to pay an acceptable price. (R. at 322, p. 9, In. 5-7.) Accordingly, neither Hales
nor Riverside had any interest or need for a broker in a traditional sense. Hales
ultimately learned that TBC had misrepresented the Park's performance and value,
and, accordingly, the prospective buyer, upon learning the real facts about
performance and value, was not willing to pay anywhere near $5.5 million to
19

purchase the Park. (R. at 205-06.)
In sum, at a minimum, questions of material fact existed in connection with
Riverside's claim that TBC fraudulently induced it to enter the LLA. Therefore,
the trial court erred by failing to consider extrinsic evidence in ruling in favor of
TBC.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Riverside respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's decision and remand the proceedings to the trial court for
the finder of fact to resolve issues of fact at trial.
DATED this 2 ^ day of January, 2006.

BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
Barry N. Johnson
David M. Kono
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Riverside
Mobile Home Park, L.L.C.
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foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
L.L.C., to counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee The Burgess Company at the following
address:
Scott M. Lilja

VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
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Barry N. Johnson
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Mobile Home Park, L.L.C.
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Robert S. Campbell (0557)
Scott M.Lilja (4231)

Third Judicial District
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OCT 2 0,2004

50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Attorneys for Plaintiff

;y Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BURGESS COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
L.L.C., ROBERT R. BUSCH, an individual
STARLEY D. BUSH, an individual, D.
GREGORY HALES, an individual, S and M
CO., a L.L.C. and B and B, a Utah Co., a
L.L.C.,

Case No. 02-0907609
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

On Monday, September 20, 2004, at 10:00 a.m. the Court heard argument with regard to
Plaintiff The Burgess Company's Motion to Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile Home
Park, L.L.C. Plaintiff was represented by Scott M. Lilja of Van Cott Bagley Cornwall &
McCarthy and Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. was represented by Barry N. Johnson of
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere. Also present were James M. Burgess and Greg Hales. The
Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the Motion and Memoranda
filed by the parties, and good cause appearing

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff The Burgess Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. is granted based upon the finding
of the Court that no genuine issue of fact exists and judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this f,^

day of October, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Step
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
VAN COTT B^GLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Robert S. Campbell
Scott M. Lilja
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

Barry N. Johnson
Attorneys for Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C.

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
OQ£Q
I hereby certify that on thisQO_ day of September, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be hand-delivered,
to the following:
Barry N. Johnson
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

626 294322vl
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Third Judicial District

lobertS. Campbell (0557)
ScottM.Ulja(423l)
kuCoTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
telephone: (801)532-3333
Attorneys for Plaintiff

OCT 2 0
SALT LAKE C<

By.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE BURGESS COMPANY,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
ENTERED IN REGISTRY,
' O F JUDGMENTS

-vs
JNYER.SIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
XL.C, ROBERT R. BUSCH, an individual
STARLJ3Y D. BUSH, an individual, D.
OREGORY HALES, an individual, S and M
CO., a L.L.C. and B and B, a Utah Co., a
JLJLG,

DATE

Case No. 02-0907609
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.
Plaintiff The Burgess Company's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile
Home Park, L.L.C. was heard before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, District Judge, and that
Motion having been granted in favor of The Burgess Company and against Riverside Mobile
Home Park, L.L.C,
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff The Burgess Company
recover from Defendant Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. as follows:
1.

As damages, $184,000.00;

JD16462723

2,

Pre-judgment interest thereon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-1(2), at the

statutory rate of 10% ($50.41) per dayfromMay 3,2002, to the date of entry of this Judgment in
the mount of $ ^ 36f/;
3,

£&**&

#fo/*f*)9

Post-judgment interest thereon pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-4 at the rate of

410%; and
4,

For costs incurred in the amount of $ Z'F^h

DATED this

day of October, 2004.
BY THE COURT.

The Honorable Step
District Court Judge
^APPROVED AS TO FORM:
"VAN COT3>KAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

j&r

Roberts* Campbel
Scott M.Lilja
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BENNETT TUELLBR JOHNSON & DEERB

Barry N- Johnson
Attorneys for Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C,

2

•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this<^j£jL day of September, 2004, I caused a true and correct
sopy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be hand-delivered, to the following:
Barry N. Johnson
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

<S2U?4322rl
<52U98S3lvl
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG - 12005

Order Prepared by:

SALT UKE COUNTY
By.

Barry N. Johnson (6255)
David M.Kono (8770)
Shane L.Keppner (9183)
BETSNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone No.; 801-272-5600
Facsimile No.: 801-278-1541

Deputy Clerk

INTHETHIRIl Hl.li I I 1,1 , I IIICTCOURT

\ AND FOR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BURGESS COMPANY,

ORDER GRANTING RULE 54(b)
CERTIFICATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
L.L.C., ROBERT R. BUSCH, an
individual, STARLEY D. BUSH, an
individual, D. GREGORY HALES, an
individual, S and M CO., a L.L.C. and B
and B, a Utah Co., a L.L.C,

Civil No.: 020907609
Judge Stephen L. Roth

Defendants.

'r 1* "V *r *

1

Based on the parties' Stipulation, the Court's July 13,2005 Minute Entry, and for good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the summary judgment entered by this Court on October
25, 2O04 in favor of Plaintiff The Burgess Company and against Defendant Riverside Mobile
Home Park, L.L.C, ("Riverside") may be certified as a final and appealable judgment for the
purposes of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Because the Judgment wholly
disposed of claims against Riverside and because the remaining claims against co-Defendants
Robert R. Busch, Starley D, Bush, D. Gregory Hales, S and M, Co., and B and B, involve only
the secondary issue of potential recovery for supposed disbursement of funds from Riverside to
its principals, no just reason for delay exists and the Judgment is deemed final for the purposes of
appeal.
DATED this J _ day of

f w \

, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

a

Honoraole
ritt Stephen L, Roth
Third District Court Judge
Approved as toibrm:

Scott MXilja
Attorney for Plainti;

lab D

Barry N. Johnson (6255)
David M.Kono (8770)
BEMNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone No.: 801-272-5600
Facsimile No.: 801-278-1541
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BURGESS COMPANY,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
L.L.C., ROBERT R. BUSCH, an
individual, STARLEY D. BUSH, an
individual, D. GREGORY HALES, an
individual, S and M CO., a L.L.C. and B
and B, a Utah Co., a L.L.C,

Civil No.: 020907609
Judge Stephen L. Roth

Defendants.

T() Tl IE CLERK OF THE COl MM AND ALL PARTIES OF RECORD:
Notice is hereby given that Defendant and Appellant, Riverside Mobile Home Park,
L.L.C. ("Riverside"), by and through its counsel and pursuant to Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Com I ilir hulj'mnu entm-d
in this matter on October 20,2004 by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod of the Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County and certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on August 1,2005 by the Honorable Stephen L. Roth ot the same
Court.
This appeal is takenfromthe Judgment awarded pursuant to the Court's Order Granting
Summary Judgment against Riverside, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit 1, and this Court's Order Granting Rule 54(b) Certification, a true and correct copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
DATED this

of August, 2005.
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

fcury N. Johnson
David M. Kono
Attorneys for Riverside

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ZY^day of August, 2005,1 caused to be mailed, first class,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, to:
Scott M. Lilja
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

David M. Kono
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Q Mease contnfient

Dear Greg,
Rease review, execute A.S A P . and i wfli bring in the offer, i agre"e to split total fee indicated
herein 50:60 with Development West,
James

RMHP 000065
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LIMITED LISTING AGREEMENT
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK
West Valley City, Utah
PARTIES:
A. James M. Burgess is a licensed Utah Real Estate Broker for The Burgess
Company, A Utah corporation herein designated as "Agent*
Mr. Robert R. Busch, Statfey D. Bush, and D. Gregory Hales are principals of
Riverside Mobile Home Park L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, herein
designated "OwwW of record of the subject property. The subject property is a
29.01 acre site with construction near completion to build a 201 space mobile
home park. The property is located at approximately 3595 South 1300 West,
West Valley City, Utah and is more commonly known as The Riverside Mobile
Home Park hereinafter referred to as the "Property" more fully described and to
be attached hereto as Exhibit "A* titled Legal Descriptions. Owner is interested in
selling the property at the following price and terms:
PRICB: $5,500,000.00 (Five Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars)
TERMS: Cash or any other terms and conditions which may be acceptable to
Owner.
Owner warrants that he is the owner of the above listed land and wishes Agent
to use best efforts to secure an acceptable buyer. Therefore, Owner grants
Agent the limited right to secure an acceptable buyer, however, Agent is to only
solicit those clients which he has registered with Owner. In the event Agent is
successful in procuring a Buyer, Owner agrees to pay Agent 4.00% of the value
of the Property agreed to and payable in cash upon dose of escrow only.
Furthermore, Owner agrees that in the event of all or a portion of Property is
optioned by Agent's registered client, Agent shall be compensated at the same
4.00% commission however only upon actual exercising of option by Agent's
registered client.
Owner further agrees that Owner shall pay Agent the Fees as set forth above if,
within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days after the expiration or termination
of this agreement, the property is sold, optioned or Joint ventured or Owner
enters Into a contract of sale, option.or Joint venture on the Property with, or
negotiations on the Property continue, resume or commence and thereafter
continue leading to a sale, option or joint venture of the Property to any person
or entity (including successors, assigns or affiliates) with whom Agent has
properly registered with Owner. Agent Is authorized to continue negotiations with
such persons or entities. Agent has been previously authorized by Owner,
however is herein formally authorized to continue to work with Affordable
Residential Communities (ARC) as his client. Agent further agrees to submit any

JuC '5'.a00i'' "8'j0a^i

TJ*'BORI^SS'CCWANY"
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OWNER:
Riverside Mobile Home Park, L L C ,
A limited Liability Corporate

* ** a p e r t ° d ° f 180 da^ **" «* - / f .
AGENT:
The Burgess Company
A Utah Coloration

Exhibit "A" Legal Description
(To Ete Provided)

TabG

Ik Burgess Company
Wednesday, February 27,2002
Fax Transmission: 310/545-9960

ARC
Attn: Mrs. Lisa Jordan

Dear Lisa,
In a discussion with Greg Hales yesterday, Greg indicates he has emailed to you
acceptable purchase scenarios as follows:
1. $4,500,000.00 all cash with Seller responsible for 2% fee
2. $4,600,000.00 all cash with Buyer responsible for 2% fee
Either scenario was fine with me until Greg clarified that he expects the 2% fee to
be split with Development West which has never been agreed to and again
refused by me yesterday. Greg indicates that regardless of written agreements
with my firm (copy attached) Riverside intends to pursue and close the
transaction and fight it out with me thereafter.
In an attempt to avoid all of this, would you and Mat consider pricing of
$4,550,000.00 with 1% discretely paid to my firm with the understanding Seller
will pay a 2% fee (1% to The Burgess Company and 1% to Greg Hales dba
Development West)?
I appreciate that fees are not your responsibility and will respect your decision to
decline. It was simply a concept designed to bring about a smooth negotiation
and hopefully a closing.
Please advise.
sincerely,

BURG 0055
COMMERCIAL INCOME PROPERTIES

TabH

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 020907609

THE BURGESS COMPANY,

Appellate Case No. 20041028-CA

Plaintiff,

RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK,
Defendant.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SEPTEMBER 20, 2004
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

SCOTT M. LILJA
ATTORNEY AT LAW

For the Defendant:

BARRY N. JOHNSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *

1 j

SALT LAKE COUNTY; SEPTEMBER 20, 2004

2

HONORABLE JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Burgess v. Riverside.

Everybody here?

7

MR. JOHNSON:

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. LILJA:

Your Honor, Scott Lilja representing the

We are, Your Honor.
Let's go ahead on the motion.

10

Burgess Company.

11

president of the company.

12

Summary Judgment against Riverside Mobile Home Park and we

13

argue, Your Honor, this is a real straight forward motion and

14

the following facts are not in dispute.

15

Burgess and Riverside entered into a listing agreement to sell

16

a mobile home park.

17

commission to be paid upon the sale to a registered buyer and

18

it identified (inaudible) Residential Communities, ARC, as a

19

registered buyer.

20

2002 to ARC for $4.6 million.

21

period covered by the listing agreement and there's $184,000

22

owing.

23

With me here today is Mr. Burgess, the
This is Burgess Company's Motion for

On July 1, 2001,

That agreement provided for a four percent

The property was subsequently sold on May 3,
That time frame is within the

The four percent commission hasn't been paid.
In response to this motion Riverside has made three

24

arguments as to why it shouldn't have to pay that four percent

25

commission.

The first argument is that the parties modified

1

this commission agreement to two percent.

2

is aware, a real estate commission agreement has to be in

3

writing under the statute of fraud is signed by the party

4

against whom it's sought to be enforced.

5

agreement under the Statute of Frauds orally. We've laid

6

out that case law for the Court in our brief and I'm sure you

7

don't need to hear it again.

8
9

Well, as the Court

You can't modify an

What they relied on in arguing that there was this
modification are several things.

First thing they rely on is

10 I the sales agreement that was entered into between Riverside and
11

ARC where Riverside and ARC had a little handwritten notation

12

in this agreement saying we're only going to pay a two percent

13

commission.

Well, it wasn't signed by Mr. Burgess or Burgess

14 | Company and obviously it wasn't agreed to by Mr. Burgess.
15
16

Those parties can't modify that commission agreement.
Secondly, they rely on Mr. Hale's oral representation

17

that he talked to Mr. Burgess and Mr. Burgess agreed to modify

18

the agreement.

19

of a contract under the statute of fraud, it's not enforceable.

20

Again Your Honor, if it's an oral modification

Third, they rely on a letter that Mr. Burgess sent

21

proposing an alternative commission structure that actually I

22

believe worked out to a three percent commission, but

23

regardless, it was never accepted and the agreement was never

24

modified in any way.

25

modification signed by the Burgess Company and as such there is

There's no evidence of any written

2

no modification of this contract.
The second argument they make is that they were
fraudulently induced, Riverside was fraudulently induced to
enter into this agreement when the Burgess Company represented
it had a buyer, ARC, that was willing to pay five and a half
million dollars for this property.

Now Mr. Burgess did obtain

ARC as a buyer, did go to these folks and say I have a buyer
for your property, will you enter into a Limited Listing
Agreement with me?

Prior to that time he was not involved as

an agent for Riverside.

Subsequent to entering into the

Limited Listing Agreement, ARC learned some additional facts
with regard to this mobile home park and ultimately they
purchased the property in an agreed purchase for $4.6 million.
Riverside says, well, we wouldn't have entered into that
listing agreement but for the fact that you represented these
guys would pay five and a half million dollars.

First of all,

Your Honor, a representation by Mr. Burgess to the effect that
I've got a buyer whose willing to pay five and a half million
dollars is a number of things.

it's a statement of belief. It

may be sales puffing, maybe representation of future events but
it's hardly an actual fraudulent statement.

I think the Sertos

case, Your Honor, as you're fully aware of that case, stands
for that proposition.
Secondly, if there's no agreement, they would have no
buyer.

The benefit of this listing agreement was that Burgess

3

1

Company delivered a buyer to this property and that buyer

2

ultimately bought the property and the law is very clear and we

3

set it out in our memoranda, Your Honor, that you don't get to

4

accept the benefits of the contract entered into and then say

5

but I'm not going to pay you what you're owed under that

6

contract after you've done that.

7

waive and estoppel and ratification that we put forth in our

8

memoranda all support that proposition, Your Honor.

9

And I think the theories o f

Finally Your Honor, this new found position, it just

10

conflicts with the terms of the listing agreement itself.

The

11

listing agreement sets a sales price or an asking price of five

12

and a half million dollars but it doesn't say you're entitled

13

to a commission if this property sells for five and a half

14

million dollars to this buyer.

It says you're entitled to a

15 I four percent commission on whatever the agreed sales price is
16

and that's all Mr. Burgess and his company are asking for.

17

They agreed to a sales price with a commission of $184,000.

18 J

Finally they argue that the Burgess Company had

19 | entered into an agreement with Mr. Hales and his company,
20

Development West, to split that four percent commission.

Your

21

Honor, Riverside isn't a party to that agreement and Mr. Hales

22 i isn't a party to the agreement between Burgess and Riverside.
23

You've got two separate contracts.

We're talking about the

24

Riverside-Burgess contract here today and as to that contract,

25

there's no question they sold to the buyer Mr. Burgess brought

4

1

to the table.

They sold it in the time frame of the contract,

2

they owe the four percent commission.

3

THE COURT:

Thanks, Mr. Lilja.

4

Mr. Johnson?

5

MR. JOHNSON:

Thank you, Your Honor. Barry Johnson

6

appearing on behalf of the defendants and specifically here

7

today Riverside Mobile Home Park.

8

the principal of Riverside.

9

parties that come up and I'll just indicate who those are.

With me is Greg Hales who is

There's also a couple of other

10

Development West is a real estate development company.

11

Hales is a primary shareholder in that entity.

12

West is a real estate brokerage firm and Greg Hales is the

13 I broker behind that brokerage firm, Realty West.

Mr.

Also Realty

Those are all

14

separate legal entities of which Greg Hales is a principal and

15

a primary equity member or share holder.

16 I

We have two legal arguments that we propose to

17 I (inaudible) this summary judgment motion and obviously don't
18

need to raise with the Court the burden that the plaintiff has

19 I to make summary judgment motion.

But in any event, the

20 I disputed the facts we think are these; first, with regard to
21

the contract issue.

The contract issue is that Burgess himself

22

does not provide the court in connection with its motion the

23

entire agreement.

24

agreement that is attached to his affidavit but includes also a

25

cover letter that is sent over with the proposed listing

The entire agreement is not just the listing

1

agreement and we have provided that in connection with Greg

2

Hales' affidavit.

3

copy.

Has the Court seen that?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

I have another

Yes, I have it.
That agreement says clearly, please

6

review, execute ASAP and 1 will bring in the offer, 1 agree to

7

split total fee indicated herein 50-50 with Development West .

8

Greg Hales in his affidavit indicates that really Realty West

9

would be the real estate broker sharing in the fee.

But this

10

cover letter was sent with the unsigned listing agreement and

11

we have authority, unable to find any specific on point

12 ! authority in Utah, but we do have authority in other
13

jurisdictions indicating that generally a writing should be

14

interpreted as a whole and all the writings that are part of

15

the same transaction should be interpreted together, and then

16 | the case I'm referring to is a District of New York federal
17

case that cites Ohio law.

18

language contained in a cover letter in determining the

19

validity or defining the terms of disputed agreements.

20

then it say, a parenthetical to Ohio case says finding the

21

trial court's interpretation of ambiguous contract term, was

22

buttressed by language in cover letter sent with draft of the

23

agreement.

24

Ohio Courts have often considered

And

So our position is is that Burgess sent over this

25 I unsigned listing agreement with this cover letter saying sign

1

it and I'll split the fee.

2

between Realty West and Burgess.

3

Riverside now has a listing agreement where it knows there's a

4

third party expecting to be paid half of the commission

5

reflected in the listing agreement.

6

not entitled to four percent and never expected four percent

7

and we think that that's quite clear in the agreements.

8
9

Well, there's no agreement really
The agreement is Riverside.

So Burgess obviously is

More importantly, when this sale ultimately closed,
we have a communication between Burgess and the buyer that it's

10

very clear in the communication that Mr. Hales and Riverside

11

were not privy to the communication and we have that also as an

12

exhibit to Mr. Hales' affidavit and I'll refer to that.

13

is prior to closing of the ultimate deal and Mr. Burgess sends

14

a letter to Ms. Lisa Jordan who is part of the buyer's

15

organization.

16

these two scenarios.

ARC is the buyer.

This

He says, look, I propose

If $4.5 million is the sale price, then

17 J there's a two percent commission.

If $4.6 is the sale price,

18 I then there's a two percent commission and he says it doesn't
19

matter to him, either scenario is okay with him knowing that a

20

two percent commission is going to be paid.

21

THE COURT:

That's not what the letter says.

22

either scenario was fine with me.

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

Now—
It says

Right, but we give this letter as

evidence that he knew at some point in time that he was going

25 j to be getting a two percent commission and it didn't matter to

7

1

him based on this letter - and the Court's correct, it was p a s t

2

tense because Mr. Hales was arguing that still there's a 50-50

3

split of the two percent, so we want just one percent to go t o

4

Burgess.

5

good evidence and strong evidence that Mr. Burgess never

6

expected more than two percent because he said he would have

But in any event we believe this letter constitutes

7 I been fine with that.
sees
9 I

But then he goes on to say as the Court

that no, I'm not okay with that, I want the two percent.
Then we think the most telling evidence is in the

10

second to the last paragraph where he says, pay a two percent

11

commission and go ahead and do it the way Hales is expecting,

12 I one percent to me, one percent to Hales but then just add 50
13 I grand to the sales price and give me another one percent
14

discretely.

15

us because he's attempting to raise the sale price and

16

interfering with our sale is really relevant to this hearing,

17

but nevertheless it confirms that he also sidesteps his deal

18

which was to split the fee and doesn't want to split this last

19

one percent that he's proposing gets paid.

20

And we think that that not only is concerning to

In any event, we think that with regard to the

21

contract issue, there are disputed facts and in particular the

22

cover letter constitutes part of the transaction and at the

23

most, he'd be entitled to two percent and we believe that when

24

the Court hears the evidence or the finder of fact hears the

25

evidence, that at most on the contract claims he's entitled to

8

1

one percent.

2

That's our argument on the contract claim.

With regard to the other issue creating disputed

3

facts, we have in Mr. Hales' affidavit set out sufficient facts

4

we believe that constitute a good faith defense of fraud and

5

inducement.

6

need another real estate broker to list property and to market

7

it.

8

it was entered into only because Mr. Burgess had a potential

9

buyer.

Mr. Hales is a real estate broker.

He doesn't

This agreement was entered into as a limited agreement and

Hales in his affidavit says there's no way I would have

10

entered a four percent listing agreement even with the split if

11

I wasn't going to get five and a half million dollars.

12

what caused me to enter the listing agreement, a five and a

That's

13 J half million dollar sale and then what happens is that doesn't
14 I happen.
15
16
17 j

The 5.5 dollars turns to 4.8—
THE COURT:

But there's no contingencies in the

listing agreement.
MR. JOHNSON:

Understand there's no contingencies but

18 | part of the inducement is a defense that gets us beyond parole
19

evidence and entitled to have it heard by the trier of fact in

20

connection with what induced Mr. Hales to enter the agreement.

21

I think that's an issue for another day.

22
23

I think we have sufficient disputed facts with regard
to what the contractual arrangement is.

They sought through

24 I their motion a four percent commission and we think the
25 j transaction itself demonstrates they're entitled to two

9

1

percent.

The other two percent obviously goes to Realty West

2

if the Court were to find that that was the final agreement and

3

Realty West obviously is not an affiliated entity but it's made

4 I up of the same principal and so for practical reasons, we think
5

it would be inappropriate to enter judgment for four percent

6

and cause Riverside then to be facing a claim by Realty West

7

for the 50/50 split that it was entitled to.

So, they haven't

8 j asked for the two percent, they've asked for four percent today
9
10

and that's why we think the motion ought to be denied and the
matter heard by the trier of fact.

11

THE COURT:

Thank you.

12

Mr. Lilja, any response?

13

MR. LILJA:

Very briefly, Your Honor.

There's no

14 I possibility of Riverside being faced by a claim from Realty
15

West.

Riverside has no contract with Realty West to pay any

16 I commission whatsoever.

What we're trying to do is we're trying

17

to get down to the agreements that actually exist here and the

18

agreements that actually exist are between Riverside and

19

Burgess and allegedly between Burgess and now Realty West

20

(inaudible) Development West but the one is not related to the

21

other, Your Honor, and this argument about the cover letter

22 J which purports to establish a separate contract being part of
23

the contract with Riverside is simply, you know, doesn't hold

24

up.

25

If the Court has any questions, I'd be glad to answer

10

them.

We think it's a very straight forward matter and we

believe summary judgment is appropriate.
THE COURT:
forward matter.

Thank

you.

I agree

that

it's a straight

We have one contract that meets all the legal

requirements for a contract and then we've got a much of parole
evidence.

Plaintiff's motion is granted as prayed.
MR. LILJA:

Thank you, Your Honor. Would you like m e

to prepare an order?
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON:

Please, thank you.
Would the Court entertain the motion to

have Realty West intervene in this matter to seek its share of
the four percent commission?
THE COURT:

If you want to file a motion you're

certainly entitled to file a motion but this disposes of the
case entirely, doesn't it?
MR. LILJA:

I believe it does, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I don't think your Motion to Intervene is

timely since the case just ended.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

24
25
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